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The Five Indicia of Virtual Property 
CHARLES BLAZER*
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans use “it” every day.  Although it is intangible, it may 
be worth thousands of dollars.  Because we can both control it and prevent 
other people from controlling it, we assume, without much thought, that we 
own it.  Sometimes we pay someone a monthly fee to hold it for us.  Some-
times, simply by using it, we increase its value.  When we finish using it, 
we often sell it. 
“It” is virtual property, and it may take the form of an email address, a 
website, a bidding agent, a video game character, or any number of other 
intangible, digital commodities.  If it were to be damaged or stolen, the 
immediate questions would be: (1) how should a court identify it; and (2) 
what degree of legal protection should it receive? 
Because no court or legislature in the United States yet has recognized 
virtual property interests, a combination of contract and custom currently 
controls the relationship between Internet users and service providers.  
This legal status quo generally provides sufficient framework to structure 
this relationship to the parties’ benefit.  Thanks to services offered by 
Internet businesses, users have access to valuable tools and resources that 
they would not otherwise have; users may trust reputable service providers 
not to sabotage the value of those tools and resources; and, despite omi-
nous language in certain click-wrap agreements, service providers gener-
ally do not interfere with the secondary market for virtual property.1  
Therefore, unless a service provider recklessly or intentionally maligns a 
user’s virtual property interests, the legal status quo should not be dis-
turbed, as between a user and a service provider. 
The legal status quo, however, poses a significant risk to users trans-
acting in virtual property with other users, paradoxically in part due to the 
efforts of service providers to ensure the quality of their services.  Given 
 * J.D. candidate, 2007, Franklin Pierce Law Center.  The author would like to thank Professor 
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 1. Such interference generally only occurs when the activity of a minority of users threatens to 
undermine core features of the service from which the majority of users (and the service provider) 
derive value, as in the Blacksnow Interactive v. Mythic Entertainment example.  See infra Part II.A.4 
(discussing the Blacksnow case).  Note that the Blacksnow case was dismissed by default, without an 
opinion on the merits. 
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the uncertain landscape of virtual property law, typical End User License 
Agreements (EULAs) (between users and service providers) raise ques-
tions of unconscionability, notice, and consent, thereby undermining the 
enforceability of users’ interests.2  Those using eBay.com and other ser-
vices to trade online user accounts face a labyrinth of legal uncertainty.  If, 
as suggested by the typical EULA, users have no property interest in their 
accounts, then their trades may be void, e.g., for lack of consideration.  
Despite this uncertainty, the secondary market value of virtual property is 
undeniable.3  People trade virtual property every day.4  Users need legal 
protection and certainty when dealing with other users in these trades. 
Skeptical courts may be slow to accept the concept of virtual property, 
preferring instead the comfort of preexisting legal doctrines.  Several cir-
cuitous legal constructs can help litigants temporarily avoid the virtual 
property question, but such resort will likely fail to serve the parties’ long-
term interests.  Potential alternative constructs include: licensor-licensee,5 
trespass to electronic chattels,6 copyright infringement,7 and trade secret 
  
 2. See, e.g., Zachary M. Harrison, Comment, Just Click Here: Article 2B’s Failure to Guarantee 
Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 907, 938-42 (1998) (arguing that users accepting terms of common click-wrap agreements rarely 
manifest a subjective intent to agree, thereby raising questions of effective consent and threatening the 
ability to withdraw consent).  But see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 
1996) (reciting practical advantages of the current market reality and affirming the enforceability of 
click-wrap licenses).  This note posits no opinion as to whether typical EULA terms are unconscion-
able.  Rather, given the potential value of virtual property, the emotionally addictive nature of Mas-
sively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs), and the circumstances surrounding typical click-wrap 
agreements, this note simply suggests that users are likely to explore the doctrine of unconscionability 
as a means to attack EULA terms.  See generally Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of 
“Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet 
Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5TH 309 (2003) (collecting discussion and case law relating to software 
licenses but not specifically pertaining to virtual property). 
 3. See generally Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society 
on the Cyberian Frontier (CESifo Working Paper Series, Paper No. 618, 2001), http://ssrn.com/ ab-
stract=294828 (documenting the secondary market for virtual characters and treasures in the MMOG 
Everquest, developed by Verant Interactive). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra Part III.A (discussing how the relationship between a service provider and a user is 
analogous to a licensor-licensee relationship, in the traditional property context). 
 6. See Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 427 (2004) (discussing the revival of trespass to chattels as a “pragmatic 
answer to the problem of electronic invasions” and predicting the evolution of “cyber-nuisance” as an 
independent cause of action, though not specifically addressing the type of virtual property discussed 
herein); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Applicability of Common-Law Trespass Actions to Electronic 
Communications, 107 A.L.R. 5TH 549 (2003) (collecting cases).  But see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual 
Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1081 (2005) (noting that the doctrine of trespass to chattels will often 
fail to adequately resolve virtual property disputes “because it is possible to steal virtual property 
without ever touching a chattel computer owned by the owner of the virtual property, or hacking a 
server”). 
 7. See Greg S. Weber, The New Medium of Expression: Introducing Virtual Reality and Anticipat-
ing Copyright Issues, 12 COMPUTER/L.J. 175, 190-91 (1993) (“[Virtual Reality] insiders agree that with 
this technology, the user becomes a cocreator of his or her experience”); see also Molly Stephens, Sales 
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misappropriation.8  Although each of these alternatives may be sufficient 
to resolve limited cases, recognizing virtual property for what it is—a le-
gitimate property interest inducing reasonable expectations of legal protec-
tion—would provide a more predictable and broadly applicable solution. 
The question therefore becomes, how should courts identify protect-
able virtual property interests?  Partially due to the dramatic success of 
Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs)9 and the rise of secon-
dary markets for virtual characters and treasures from those games,10 a 
recent frenzy of legal scholarship has struggled to resolve this question.11  
This note supports the legal recognition of virtual property interests, as 
already convincingly justified by the legal analogy to traditional property 
interests set forth by Professor Joshua Fairfield,12 buttressed by the practi-
cal reality that virtual property has significant economic value.13
Building on these rationales, this note proposes five indicia, common 
to most forms of virtual property, which a court should use to identify le-
gally protectable virtual property interests on the Internet.  These indicia 
are: (1) rivalry; (2) persistence; (3) interconnectivity; (4) secondary mar-
kets; and (5) value-added-by-users.14  This note cautions, however, against 
applying this newfound definition indiscriminately against the interests of 
  
of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect 
Digital-Content Creators, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1528 (2002) (concluding that service providers gener-
ally cannot invoke copyright law to restrict secondary market sales). 
 8. See generally Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, What Is Computer “Trade Secret” Under State 
Law, 53 A.L.R. 4TH 1046 (1987) (collecting trade secret case law).  For example, Gross’ annotation 
arranges cases according to six factors relevant to determining trade secret status in particular circum-
stances: 1) extent to which information is known outside employer’s business; 2) extent of measures 
taken by employer to guard secrecy of information; 3) value of information to employer and to his 
competitors; 4) amount of effort or money expended by employer in developing information; 5) ease or 
difficulty with which information can be properly acquired or duplicated by others; and 6) extent to 
which information is known by employees and others involved in employer’s business.   Id.  Abstracted 
beyond the realm of employer-employee relationships, these six factors vaguely relate to the virtual 
property interests inherent in service provider-user relationships.   Under the trade secret analogy, a 
password required to access a user’s account is the “information” at issue.  Misappropriation of such 
“information” could cause financial damage, thereby incurring liability.   Fully exploring the potential 
analogy between trade secrets and virtual property, however, is a topic for another day.  Moreover, 
such a contortion of preexisting law would disserve jurisprudence by dodging the real issue—the prop-
erty interests at stake. 
 9. See generally BRUCE WOODCOCK, AN ANALYSIS OF MMOG SUBSCRIPTION GROWTH – 
VERSION 18.0, http://www.mmogchart.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (tracking active subscriptions 
to online game worlds). 
 10. See generally Castronova, supra note 3 (documenting the secondary market for virtual charac-
ters and treasures in the MMOG Everquest, developed by Verant Interactive). 
 11. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053 (advocating for legal recognition of virtual property). 
 12. See id. (analogizing virtual property to “real world” property). 
 13. See generally Castronova, supra note 3 (discussing the monetary value generated by individual 
Everquest players and by Everquest, as a whole). 
 14. The first three indicia of virtual property (rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity) were first 
articulated by Professor Joshua Fairfield.  Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053-54.  This note suggests that 
secondary markets and value-added-by-user are equally significant indicia of virtual property. 
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the very entities without whom the property would not exist: the businesses 
hosting the remotely accessed computer resources (i.e., the service provid-
ers). 
Professor Fairfield and other legal scholars already have illustrated the 
compelling and well-reasoned legal analogy between virtual property and 
traditional property.15  Indeed, most virtual property is deliberately de-
signed to behave like traditional property.16  Thus, three of the five pro-
posed indicia of virtual property derive directly from the analogy to tradi-
tional property.17  Specifically, virtual property shares with traditional 
property the characteristics of rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity.18  
For example, a user’s email address is rivalrous because, by using the ad-
dress, the user prevents other people from using it.  The email address is 
persistent because it continues to exist even when it is not being used.  
Lastly, the email address is interconnected because it is part of a system 
where people may interact with it according to certain rules.  Real prop-
erty, such as land, is likewise generally rivalrous, persistent, and intercon-
nected.19
This analogy, however, is not perfect.  Whereas an interest in land or 
chattels may be entirely acquired and assigned,20 Internet users acquire and 
access virtual property as a result of service providers’ initial and continu-
ing investment in computer hardware, software, and intellectual property.  
Thus, virtual property law must not only balance the interests of users 
against the interests of other users; the law must also balance the interests 
of users against the interests of service providers.21
  
 15. Id. at 1053; F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 49 (2004) (applying traditional property theories to justify the enforceability of virtual property 
interests).  The term “traditional property” is used herein, for lack of a better term, to encompass both 
real and personal property, to the exclusion of intellectual property.  Professor Fairfield uses the term 
“real world property.”  Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053. 
 16. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053. 
 17. See infra Part I (discussing the characteristics of rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity, as 
well as other indicia of property interests). 
 18. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053-54. 
 19. Note that intellectual property arguably does not meet any of these criteria.  The analogy be-
tween intellectual property and virtual property may be tempting, given that they are both intangible 
property interests, but this is where the similarity ends. 
 20. Disregarding, for the moment, inalienable interests such as droit moral.  See generally Timothy 
E. Nielander, Reflections on a Gossamer Thread in the World Wide Web: Claims for Protection of the 
Droit Moral Right of Integrity in Digitally Distributed Works of Authorship, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 59, 71 (1997) (defining the inalienable droit moral right of integrity and discussing its impli-
cations for copyright law in cyberspace, with examples of representative causes of action in the United 
States and abroad). 
 21. Furthermore, while the analogy to traditional property may be instructive, it may underrate the 
economic value and effect of virtual property.  As summarized by Professor Fairfield, in 2005: 
The projected U.S. revenue from sales of virtual objects in real-world currency is approxi-
mately $100 million dollars, and over $1.5 billion worth of transactions occurs yearly 
through [virtual] trades. The secondary market in virtual items was recently estimated at 
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Therefore, to supplement Fairfield’s indicia, the presence of secondary 
markets and value-added-by-users may serve as additional indicia of a vir-
tual property interest worthy of legal protection.  These two indicia explic-
itly allow courts to weigh practical economic considerations in determining 
the amount of protection to be accorded to a user’s virtual property inter-
ests, specifically in light of the legitimate interests of service providers.  
Part II of this note describes each of these five indicia individually, with 
examples. 
Part III of this note applies the five indicia to the well-established 
framework of traditional property to illustrate this balancing process.  
Throughout the development of the law in this area, courts must retain the 
freedom and flexibility to craft appropriate equitable remedies on a case-
by-case basis, and special attention should be directed to the practical is-
sues commonly faced by Internet service providers.  The ultimate purpose 
of virtual property jurisprudence should be to strike a balance that provides 
legal redress to users whose legitimate virtual property interests have been 
violated while simultaneously reducing liability and disincentives to ser-
vice providers who promote and sustain the growth of the Internet. 
II. IDENTIFYING VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
Virtual property is persistent computer code stored on a remote source 
system, where one or more persons are granted certain powers to control 
the computer code, to the exclusion of all other people.22  Similar to tradi-
tional property, virtual property is often rivalrous, persistent, and intercon-
nected.23  Virtual property often is traded in secondary markets,24 and us-
  
over $880 million dollars, and is expanding quickly.  [Norrath, one of several virtual worlds 
in the MMOG Everquest,] had, as of 2002, a greater net worth than Bulgaria and a higher 
GNP per capita than India or China.  Likewise, the individual as well as the aggregate value 
of the virtual property bought and sold is rising—a piece of virtual real estate within a vir-
tual environment recently sold for approximately $30,000. 
Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1062. 
 22. This is my own formulation of the definition of virtual property.  Cf. id. at 1049-50 (defining 
virtual property as computer code designed to act more like land or chattel than ideas).  No United 
States court or legislature has yet provided a controlling definition. 
 23. Id. at 1053.  In his article, Professor Fairfield initially sets forth the relevance of rivalry, persis-
tence, and interconnectivity.  Id. at 1053-54.  For the purposes of this note, Professor Fairfield’s choice 
of relevant characteristics is accepted and expanded. 
 24. See also Castronova, supra note 3, at 18 (asserting that a virtual world is a real economy, from 
an economist’s point of view, in part because the virtual assets may be exchanged with real world 
money at a floating exchange rate). 
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ers of virtual property often add value to the property just by using it.25  





4) Secondary Markets; and 
5) Value-Added-by-Users. 
 
This note borrows the indicia of rivalry, persistence, and interconnec-
tivity from Professor Fairfield’s article.26  These three indicia, in particular, 
illustrate the parallel between traditional property and virtual property.27  
However, virtual property is intangible—similar to intellectual property.28  
A court wary of unduly contorting intellectual property law to accommo-
date the frontiers of virtual property may look to Fairfield’s analysis to 
understand that, in fact, virtual property may fall safely within the bounds 
of traditional property law without adversely affecting intellectual property 
law.29  To supplement Fairfield’s analysis and because of the significant 
economic interests and potential claims to natural rights likely lurking in a 
virtual property dispute, this note adds the latter two indicia (secondary 
markets and value-added-by-users) as additional considerations for the 
courts.30
  
 25. This characteristic has been loosely equated to co-authorship, in the copyright sense, or natural 
rights, in the more general, property-theory sense.  See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 46-47 
(discussing Lockean theories of property rights through labor as a supplemental justification for the 
legal recognition of virtual property interests);  Weber, supra note 7, at 190-91 (“[Virtual Reality] 
insiders agree that with this technology, the user becomes a cocreator of his or her experience”);  An-
drew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works 
Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 175-76 (1997) 
(noting that software programmers and users may be co-authors of works created using computer 
programs).  
 26. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053-54. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 1064 (describing virtual property as “code that is intangible, but that has been coded to 
act as if it were tangible”). 
 29. Id. at 1096; see generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 446 (2003) (expressing the potential negative side effects of un-
duly contorting intellectual property law to create new intangible property interests in cyberspace).  
Furthermore, this note explicitly distinguishes virtual property from intellectual property.  See, e.g., 
infra Part II.A.2 (using the five indicia suggested herein to distinguish virtual property from intellectual 
property). 
 30. See generally Castronova, supra note 3 (documenting the development of secondary markets 
surrounding the MMOG Everquest, by Sony Online Entertainment); Julian Dibbell, The Unreal Estate 
Boom, WIRED, Jan. 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/gaming.html  (de-
scribing the time and money committed by MMOG players to increase the value of their user ac-
counts); Posting of Edward Castronova to Terranova, http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2006/01/ 
how_a_gold_farm.html (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Castronova Posting] (describing a virtual treasure 
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Altogether, the five indicia form a framework for identifying protect-
able virtual property.  In the rapidly changing and unpredictable realm of 
the Internet, however, no test should be absolute or overly rigid.  The indi-
cia should be considered as a totality, with the reasonable expectations of 
ordinarily prudent consumers underpinning any analysis. 
A.  The Five Indicia of Virtual Property 
1.  Rivalry 
Rivalry is the inherent characteristic of traditional property that limits 
control of the property, at any given time, to one person.31  Simply put, a 
shoe can only be worn by one person at a time; thus, the shoe is rivalrous 
personal property.  Viewed another way, by wearing the shoe, the wearer 
presently excludes all others from using it.  Intangible rivalrous property, 
such as an email address, is an example of virtual property.  By appropriat-
ing an email address for personal use, the user excludes others from using 
it. 
Rivalry is the principal difference between virtual property and intel-
lectual property.  Intellectual property is not only intangible but also non-
rivalrous.  For example, by listening to a song stored in MP3 compression 
format, the listener in no way affects the ability of others to listen to the 
same song.  Likewise, by affixing golden arches to a product as a trade-
mark, the producer in no way affects the ability of others to use exactly the 
same trademark.32  Limitations on the use of intellectual property arise not 
from rivalry, but from exclusionary rights enforceable at law.33  Thus, the 
simplest and most immediate method for distinguishing virtual property 
from intellectual property is to determine whether the property in question 
is actually rivalrous or merely protected by an exclusionary right. 
Note, however, that rivalry alone does not give rise to virtual property 
and that some forms of virtual property may be “semi-rivalrous.”  For ex-
  
“farm” with sixteen employees, in the MMOG Everquest, which generated nearly $800,000 per year in 
income). 
 31. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053. 
 32. Trademark exclusivity arises only through action of law in the interest of protecting consumers 
from confusing or deceptive trade practices.  See Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695, 696-97 (2d 
Cir. 1956) (In the words of Judge Learned Hand, “[a] trade-mark is indeed often spoken of as a mo-
nopoly; but in fact it is only part of the protection of the owner’s business from diversion to others by 
means of deceit.”).  This is not rivalry in the physical sense.  Rather, trademark exclusivity is a purely 
legal construct. 
 33. See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (affirming the 
right to exclude provided by a patent, regardless of non-use by the patentee); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the legal 
right to exclude others is the defining characteristic of all property). 
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ample, many people may share simultaneous control of a remote database, 
seemingly negating the characteristic of rivalry and suggesting that the 
database is not a form of virtual property.  Indeed, as public accessibility to 
a virtual resource increases, the property protections accorded to individu-
als using the resource should correspondingly decrease.  This rule reflects 
the reasonable expectations of Internet users.  Beyond individual contribu-
tions, no reasonable user expects to control the content of a public Internet 
message board.  Conversely, where access to a private chat room is tightly 
controlled and limited to members of a small group, the group, as a single 
entity, may begin to reasonably expect some level of virtual property pro-
tection.  Thus, rivalry is neither dispositive nor absolute; it merely serves 
as one of the five proposed indicia of protectable virtual property. 
2.  Persistence 
Persistence is the inherent characteristic of traditional property that 
maintains the property, generally unchanged, even when it is not being 
used.34  A parked car continues to exist, and, at the end of the day, the 
owner reasonably expects to find the car where he parked it.  Thus, like 
most forms of tangible property, the car persists.  Intangibles, however, 
often lack persistence.  For example, music persists only as long as the 
sound continues to reach an ear.  Music only becomes protectable intellec-
tual property after it is “fixed in any tangible [i.e., persistent] medium of 
expression,” such as an audio CD.35  Yet the tangible and persistent audio 
CD is not protectable intellectual property, per se.36  The intangible music 
is intellectual property, while the tangible audio CD remains personal 
property.37  Thus, intellectual property is correctly characterized as intan-
gible and lacking persistence. 
Conversely, virtual property, although intangible, is persistent.38  A 
greater degree of persistence warrants a greater property interest.  For ex-
ample, a user of remotely hosted email services, such as Yahoo! Mail, may 
reasonably expect messages saved in an “Inbox” to persist for weeks or 
months (until intentionally deleted) even though the email account is only 
  
 34. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1054. 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 36. See id. § 101 (distinguishing “Sound recordings” (the music) from “Phonorecords” (the audio 
CD)). 
 37. See id. (distinguishing “Sound recordings” (the music) from “Phonorecords” (the audio CD)); 
see also Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1096 (explicitly citing the difference between an audio CD and the 
intellectual property contained therein as analogous to the difference between a virtual property interest 
and the intellectual property which gave rise to that interest). 
 38. See Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1054 n.26 (attributing the persistence of most virtual property to 
distributed computing). 
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used for a few minutes each day.  The persistent nature of an email account 
induces reasonable reliance and increases the user’s property interest in the 
account, thereby increasing the justification for equitable intervention by 
courts to remedy third-party interferences with that interest.  In contrast, a 
low or minimal degree of persistence suggests that users’ virtual property 
interests are weak and legally unprotectable.  For example, despite the fact 
that video arcade machines often memorialize the “Top 10 High Scores,” 
no reasonable pizza parlor patron would expect a high score on a Frogger 
machine to persist for any great length of time, given that the list resets 
whenever the machine is unplugged.39
3.  Interconnectivity 
Interconnectivity is the inherent characteristic of traditional property to 
affect or to be affected by more than one person and by other property.40  
Like the other indicia of virtual property, interconnectivity is neither dispo-
sitive nor absolute, with varying degrees of interconnectivity suggesting 
varying degrees of protectable user interests.  Note that easier access does 
not necessarily equate to greater interconnectivity.  Rather, the legally pro-
tectable value of interconnectivity arises from a person’s ability to use 
property to create or experience an effect.41
For example, a free website that only allowed users to track stock 
prices probably would not create viable virtual property interests in the 
users’ accounts.  If the accounts were tampered with or were to disappear 
entirely, users would be upset, but the violation of legitimate property in-
terests would be minimal, given that the accounts lacked any capacity to 
directly affect other property.  In contrast, a website that allowed users to 
buy and sell stock may create strong virtual property interests in the users’ 
accounts.  If these accounts were tampered with, users would feel right-
fully furious and violated, and the consequent monetary damage could be 
extraordinary.  Only interconnectivity distinguishes the two examples.  
Thus, Internet services that allow users to create or experience an effect, 
  
 39. The high score list of the Frogger machine lacks persistence largely because it is a single ma-
chine with a single point of failure.  Distributed computing eliminates single points of failure, thereby 
increasing persistence.  Id.  Thus, remotely accessed distributed computing systems may indicate per-
sistence and secondarily indicate a virtual property interest.  Not all data stored on distributed comput-
ing systems, however, is virtual property.  Such data may lack other indicia of virtual property, as in the 
case of a public data store with no form of access control, i.e., a lack of rivalry. 
 40. See id. at 1054 (noting that although one person may exclusively control a tangible object, the 
object may affect other people and other property through the laws of physics). 
 41. See id. (“The value of a URL or an email address is . . . that other people can connect to it, and 
can experience it.”). 
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particularly services in e-commerce, demonstrate interconnectivity and 
thereby suggest the presence of virtual property interests. 
The above-described inherent characteristics of traditional property 
thus may guide courts in identifying virtual property interests.  Virtual 
property disputes, however, are likely to involve unpredictable and techno-
logically complex circumstances that will obscure analogies to strictly in-
herent characteristics such as rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity.  
Therefore, extrinsic characteristics, such as the behaviors of markets and 
users, may legitimately supplement the definition of virtual property. 
4.  Secondary Markets 
Courts should be particularly alert for possible virtual property inter-
ests when users develop secondary markets to trade access to and control 
of remotely hosted computer code, regardless of whether a service provider 
sanctions such trades.  For example, businesses have recognized the poten-
tial value of certain virtual properties and therefore have developed busi-
ness models based on trading such properties in secondary markets.42  As a 
matter of policy, where a free market cultivates value, courts should pro-
tect that value as long as other substantive rights are not infringed.  Courts 
should also avoid excessive “protection” which could strangle creativity 
and do more harm than good. 43
As a famous example of a business based on a secondary market for 
virtual property, in 2003 a company calling itself Blacksnow Interactive 
paid workers in Mexico to play a MMOG (Dark Age of Camelot, by 
Mythic Entertainment) full-time for the sole purpose of generating virtual 
treasure to sell on eBay.44  Presumably, Blacksnow paid Mexican workers 
a low enough wage to generate a net profit on the secondary market sales.  
In the interest of preserving “fair” play, Mythic ended Blacksnow’s prac-
tices by prohibiting game property transactions in secondary markets and 
by banning users who participated in such transactions.45  Blacksnow sued, 
but it quickly developed other legal problems and disappeared.46  Had the 
lawsuit been tried, it would have been the first litigation involving a virtual 
property dispute and could have triggered much more virtual property liti-
  
 42. See generally IGE – About Us, http://www.ige.com/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (describ-
ing the industry surrounding secondary market transactions in virtual property and the operations of 
IGE, Ltd., a profitable business specializing in the purchase and sale of virtual property from MMOGs).  
 43. See infra Part III.B (discussing the balance between the interests of service providers and users). 
 44. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 39. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 40. 
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gation.47  The Blacksnow case highlights why service providers generally 
oppose legal recognition of virtual property interests (e.g., because they 
fear losing control of their product and lawsuits from disgruntled users).48  
The case also highlights the recent proliferation of video game sweatshops 
(so-called “gold farms”) in poor countries as a highly profitable business 
model, a trend with its own disturbing legal and economic consequences.49
Thus, the economic reality is that virtual property is created, traded, 
bought, and sold just like traditional property.  Individuals and businesses 
have come to rely on this secondary market, and real assets (typically 
money) are at stake.  If the law fails to protect this value or in some way 
guarantee the market, productivity may be lost and destructive practices 
(e.g., self-help, hacking, and price-fixing) are likely to emerge. 
Furthermore, the secondary market indicium is only one of the five in-
dicia, and thus the absence of this indicium should not preclude the virtual 
“thing” at issue from being recognized as virtual property.  For example, 
email users typically do not buy email accounts from other email users, but 
this fact alone should not reduce an email user’s ability to recover a stolen 
account.50  Secondary markets simply serve as supplemental indicia of 
virtual property interests. 
5.  Value-Added-by-Users 
The fifth and final indicium is akin to co-authorship, in that multiple 
users may assume an ownership interest in a virtual property by customiz-
ing and improving the property to reflect their collective creativity.  Users 
often add value to a remotely hosted computer resource simply by using 
the resource, over time, in the manner in which it was intended to be 
  
 47. See id. at 72 (foretelling the inevitability of future lawsuits, similar to the Blacksnow case, in-
volving damage occurring to virtual property interests in a secondary market). 
 48. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing service providers’ interests). 
 49. See generally Castronova Posting, supra note 30 (describing the operation and profitability of a 
virtual treasure “farm,” with sixteen employees, in the game Everquest, by Sony Online Entertain-
ment).  Note, however, that this professional “Gold Farm” eventually went out of business, allegedly 
due to competition from professional hackers and cheaters.  Id.  Thus, the lucrative secondary market 
for virtual property has spawned multiple creative (though arguably immoral) businesses that now 
directly compete with each other.  Paradoxically, some gold farmers scorn such hackers and cheaters 
for spoiling the business of farming.  Meanwhile, players scorn the gold farmers for spoiling the 
game’s virtual economy.  Thus, drawing the line between permissible and impermissible conduct may 
ultimately hinge on a fact-specific moral judgment, supported by lessons of economic experience and 
legal policy. 
 50. An email account may be “stolen” by someone who learns the password (through hacking or 
otherwise) and changes it—a tort akin to conversion.  An email account may also be “hijacked” by 
someone who learns the password and uses the account to send unauthorized mail, usually spam—a 
tort akin to trespass.  See generally infra Part III.B.1 (discussing why service providers might not 
intervene in these circumstances, leaving users with redress only through self-help or legal action). 
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used.51  Such value-added-by-user should be distinguished, however, from 
the Lockean theory of property through labor.52  Contributing to the value 
of an intangible resource should not automatically entitle the contributor to 
a property interest in the resource—just as spraying graffiti on a building 
should not automatically entitle the graffiti artist to a property interest in 
the building.  Rather, where the nature of an interest in an intangible re-
source is such that it should qualify for legal protection, there is a high 
likelihood that the user has, at some point, added value to the resource.  
Simply put, a person is likely to improve and customize property that he 
believes belongs exclusively to himself, and, by recognizing and encourag-
ing this activity, the law of property ultimately benefits all people.53  Thus, 
value-added-by-user indicates, rather than creates, protectable virtual prop-
erty interests. 
A MMOG user account is the quintessence of value-added-by-user.  
The MMOG service provider’s business model presumes that players will 
add value to the account, thereby becoming personally invested in, or ad-
dicted to, the game.54  The initial retail (or “first sale”) value of a MMOG 
user account lies entirely in the value of having a “clean slate” from which 
to build an online identity.55  Players build online identities by interacting 
with other players, by acquiring virtual treasure, and by advancing through 
various stages of the game.  This process never ends—every hour spent 
online affects the value of a player’s online identity.56  The game begins to 
  
 51. See Weber, supra note 7, at 191 (“[Virtual Reality] insiders agree that with this technology, the 
user becomes a co-creator of his or her experience”); Wu, supra note 25, at 175-76 (noting that soft-
ware programmers and users may be co-authors of works created using computer programs). 
 52. See generally Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 46-47 (applying John Locke’s theory of 
property through labor as a supplemental justification for recognizing virtual property interests). 
 53. Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind . . . patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare.”).  In the context of virtual property, it is easy to imagine how encouraging 
users to add value to remote resources will promote creativity and growth of the Internet, thereby 
benefiting society, despite the exclusive nature of property protections.  In fact, the appeal of certain 
services depends entirely on the contributions of the users.  See, e.g., What is Second Life?, 
http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (“Second Life is a 3-D virtual world entirely 
built and owned by its residents.”). 
 54. See generally NICHOLAS YEE, ARIADNE - UNDERSTANDING MMORPG ADDICTION (2002), 
http://www.nickyee.com/hub/addiction/addiction.pdf (discussing the design elements of MMOGs 
which cultivate addictive behavior in players). 
 55. Being the first purchaser also provides added security by allowing the purchaser to create an 
anonymous account name (distinct from the publicly visible character name) and to set the first pass-
word.  The pervasive secondary market for MMOG accounts, however, indicates that the first-
purchaser-security premium is relatively small.  Moreover, it is assumed that a reasonably prudent 
secondary purchaser will immediately change the password to the account. 
 56. Castronova, supra note 3, at 14 (“The result of all this effort, which can take hundreds of hours, 
is ‘avatar capital’: an enhancement of the avatar's capabilities through training.”). 
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resemble a job, with some players spending more than eighty hours per 
week improving their virtual characters.57
Although some may suggest that this investment of time and effort 
warrants equitable protection (the Lockean theory of property through la-
bor),58 players probably would not invest such time and effort if they did 
not expect equitable protection from the beginning.  The legal justification 
for protecting the players’ property interest arises not from the hundreds of 
hours that they spend online but from the sense of ownership, security, 
utility, and value that encourages them to spend those hundreds of hours 
online.59  Moreover, the amount of time and effort that a player dedicates 
to an online identity is strong evidence of protectable virtual property lurk-
ing somewhere within the online identity, and courts should use this evi-
dence, if available, when quantifying the property interests at stake.  Time 
and effort alone, however, do not give rise to virtual property.  Rather, the 
inherent nature of a MMOG user account, rather than users’ labor, creates 
a protectable virtual property interest, which may be evidenced by the 
other four indicia of virtual property—namely rivalry, persistence, inter-
connectivity, and secondary markets. 
B.  Combining the Indicia to Identify Virtual Property  
Because technology—particularly Internet technology—continues to 
evolve at a rapid pace, it is impossible to identify, prospectively, all possi-
ble forms of virtual property.  Therefore, for the five indicia to be practical, 
they must be applied flexibly.  Potential property interests should be evalu-
ated for not only the presence or absence of each indicium, but also for the 
degree to which each indicium is present or absent.  For example, as dis-
cussed above, different web-based user accounts may exhibit varying de-
grees of interconnectivity.  Likewise, an interactive resource may be semi-
rivalrous, in that a limited number of users may be able to use the resource 
simultaneously.  Consequently, each set of circumstances should be con-
sidered in light of the aggregate indicia supporting or countering the case 
for a potential property interest.  No single factor should be dispositive. 
  
 57. Id. at 36; see also Dibbell, supra note 30 (describing how carpenter Troy Stolle would come 
home from work every day to immediately resume his second “job” as a virtual blacksmith in Ultima 
Online). 
 58. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 46-47 (applying John Locke’s theory of property 
through labor to virtual property).  Note, however, that Lastowka and Hunter only cite Lockean theo-
ries as a “fitting, or perhaps amusing” supplement to other, more contemporary, rationales for recogniz-
ing virtual property interests.  Id.     
 59. Players’ sense of ownership, security, utility, and value may arise from the property’s character-
istics of rivalry, persistence, interconnectivity, and secondary market value, respectively. 
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Significantly, a service provider’s characterization of its own content 
should have little or no legal effect.  A disclaimer stating “This is not vir-
tual property” should never be determinative; just as a disclaimer stating 
“This is not a security” cannot magically change the nature of company 
stock.60  Form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis 
should be on economic reality.61
As a result, service providers who perceive a threat in the legal recog-
nition of virtual property and who deliberately seek to usurp users’ virtual 
property interests through EULAs may still fail to secure their own inter-
ests, because the economic reality of virtual property may trump empty 
formalities in an EULA.62  Therefore, when balancing the interests of ser-
vice providers with the interests of users, courts should recognize the fact 
that service providers may be unable to limit the virtual property interests 
created by their services.  Part III.B further discusses this balancing. 
Considering all five indicia, virtual property may take many different 
forms, but some forms are more prevalent than others.  Online accounts, 
such as email and bank accounts, are a familiar form of virtual property.63  
Personalized “web-spaces,” such as amateur homepages and professional 
websites, usually exhibit the indicia of virtual property.64  Automated bid-
ding agents, moderated chat rooms, advertising space, and many other 
common Internet entities might also qualify.  Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly to millions of Internet game players, virtual avatars and the 
treasures they carry in MMOGs fall naturally within the definition of vir-
tual property.65
  
 60. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (noting that, in securities law, substance 
trumps form); cf. Wood v. Shell Oil Co., 495 So. 2d 1034, 1037 (Ala. 1986) (noting that an explicit 
disclaimer may still fail to negate an agency relationship when independent evidence suggests a re-
tained right of control—i.e., substance trumps form). 
 61. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 (referring to securities); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing 
problematic language often employed by users to disguise the economic reality behind transactions in 
virtual property). 
 62. See infra Part III.B (discussing common terms in EULAs).  But cf. Ian MacInnes, The Implica-
tions of Property Rights in Virtual Worlds, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH AMERICAS CONFERENCE ON 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2727, 2730 (2004), available at http://e-business.fhbb.ch/eb/publications.nsf/ 
bb366c7c939905e1c1256c5600643476/b1013216f68a694ac1256f100027a530/$FILE/SIGEBZ05-1668 
.pdf (arguing that “[t]he legal system may be forgiving [to game developers] in cases . . . where the 
developer acted to shut down trade in game items”). 
 63. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1055, 1057. 
 64. Id. at 1056-57. 
 65. This is largely due to the fact that MMOG providers intentionally design the game code to 
simulate real world land and chattel.  See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 30 (“Central to the 
operation of most modern virtual worlds is a property system, with . . . familiar real-world features.”). 
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III. BALANCING VIRTUAL PROPERTY INTERESTS 
A.  Relationships—The Difference Between User-to-Service Provider and 
User-to-User 
Once a court identifies a potential virtual property interest, it should 
analyze the relationships involved, to better understand the implications of 
that interest.  Typically, at least two different relationships are involved, 
each with its own implications.  The user engages in a contractual relation-
ship with the service provider and simultaneously may engage in a social 
and business relationship with other users.  Analogizing these relationships 
to commonly understood legal structures will help the court balance the 
interests of the parties for the purpose of evaluating the property rights 
involved.66
The relationship between the user and service provider can be analo-
gized to the legal structure of the licensor-licensee relationship.  Usually, 
online service providers make large initial investments in computer hard-
ware, software, and intellectual property to establish a community or web-
space with long-term growth potential.67  Service providers then license 
access to these expensive resources to users.  Users manipulate, interact 
with, and develop these resources according to certain rules set by the ser-
vice provider, as would a licensee acting within the bounds of a license. 
For example, Yahoo! Mail provides email users with one gigabyte of 
data storage space, a unique email address, a customizable email manage-
ment and filing system, a spam filter, and a virus scanner—with all the 
relevant code executing on Yahoo! Inc.’s computers, rather than on the 
user’s computer—for free.68  This relationship between Yahoo! and its 
users could be characterized as “licensed access to resources.”  Addition-
ally, among other profitable endeavors, Yahoo! recoups its initial invest-
ment by selling high-value advertising space targeted to individual user 
profiles.  Such precisely targeted exposure is extremely valuable to adver-
tisers, who may develop legitimate virtual property interests in their as-
signed advertising space.69  Thus, email accounts are not the only re-
  
 66. See infra Part III.B (discussing the balance between the interests of service providers and users). 
 67. See MacInnes, supra note 62, at 2729 (noting that in the early stages of development, service 
providers should focus on technical issues such as security and reliability). 
 68. See generally Yahoo! Help – Yahoo! Mail, http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/mail/ (last visited on 
Oct. 31, 2006) (providing a detailed overview of the features of Yahoo! Mail).  Of course, Yahoo! users 
must agree to a lengthy Terms of Service agreement.  See Yahoo! Terms of Service, 
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited on Oct. 31, 2006) (listing Yahoo! Inc.’s twenty-six terms 
of service). 
 69. Consider such advertising space in light of the five proposed indicia: (1) subject to the terms of 
their agreement with Yahoo!, advertisers generally exclude outsiders from exercising control over the 
content of their advertisements (rivalry); (2) advertisers reasonably expect the advertisements to endure 
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sources licensed by Yahoo!, and email users are not Yahoo!’s only licen-
sees. 
As another example, MMOGs also use a form of the centralized “li-
censed access to resources” model.  Although a player may purchase and 
install software on a personal computer to play a game, the player’s virtual 
property is entirely stored on the service provider’s computers.  Players 
may access their personal avatars and treasures from any computer capable 
of running the interface software.  By licensing access to remotely hosted 
resources, players derive many benefits.  For example, the service provider 
can implement better security measures to prevent hackers from tampering 
with the data and can guarantee superior data integrity through redundant 
backups.70
Note that the retail software CD, the host computers, and the virtual 
property may all belong to different parties and the system can still func-
tion perfectly.71  This fact further illustrates the distinction between virtual 
property and traditional property and should comfort service providers who 
fear that recognizing virtual property interests will somehow deprive them 
of control over the host computers.72  Simply put, by recognizing an inter-
est in virtual property, service providers do not give up ownership and con-
trol of any computers storing the virtual property.73
  
and to appear repeatedly on Yahoo! for the complete term of their contract (persistence); (3) advertisers 
include “hot-links” in their advertisements, allowing Yahoo! patrons to interact with the advertisements 
and directing patrons to the advertisers’ websites (interconnectivity); (4) advertisers sometimes cooper-
ate to share the cost of a single ad-space (a form of secondary market); and (5) the value of the adver-
tising space usually derives from its prominence, frequency of appearance, and placement on Yahoo!’s 
web pages (facets generally determined by Yahoo! as the service provider, rather than by the advertis-
ers as users—thereby lacking value-added-by-user).  Advertising space on Yahoo! thus exhibits four of 
the five indicia proposed herein, tipping the balance in favor of an enforceable virtual property interest. 
 70. As noted by Professor Fairfield, MMOGs achieve the indicia of persistence as a result of this 
distributed computing model.  Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1054 n.26.  Thus, some of the most desirable 
features sought by users of remotely hosted computer resources are exactly the features that create a 
virtual property interest. 
 71. Although, to promote the primary market for profitable software CDs, providers often require 
the user to have the CD in order to access the virtual property.  In contrast, some game developers 
deliberately forego such tie-ins.  See generally SUNEEL RATAN, PLEASE, MORE STEAM-POWERED 
GAMES (2004), http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,65758,00.html (discussing broadband 
software distribution, where users download software from the Internet rather than buying CDs in a 
store). 
 72. See Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1077-78, 1097-99 (explaining the distinction between virtual 
property and the computers it may be stored on; outlining and rebutting the “control” argument put 
forth by service providers). 
 73. See infra Part III.B (discussing the balance between the interests of service providers and users).  
If a court were to hold that the virtual property interests of users restricts the freedom of service provid-
ers to control their own computers, this would be an undue and unwise extension of virtual property 
law, as these interests can coexist without interference, if properly defined and balanced.  But see 
Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1098-99 (suggesting that the chattel property interests of service providers 
may be affected by users’ virtual property interests, but that such effects may be mitigated by compro-
mise and contractual agreements). 
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The “licensed access to resources” model common to virtual property 
relationships thus resembles the relationship between a licensor and a li-
censee of traditional property.  The licensor ostensibly owns the licensed 
property, but the licensee exercises exclusive control over the property for 
a limited time, within limits set by a license agreement.  In the virtual 
property context, the user is “borrowing” a relatively small fraction of the 
service provider’s large initial investment.  Given that the provider hosts 
the service at large initial expense and that many people benefit from the 
service, according deference to the providers’ interests is in the public in-
terest. 
In contrast, relationships between users may take any number of forms, 
depending on the facts of each case.  For example, some virtual worlds 
allow users to buy, sell, and trade virtual “land” upon which the users may 
build virtual homes, meeting halls, storefronts, towers, or castles.  Unsur-
prisingly, two users with adjacent plots of “land” could be characterized as 
neighbors, and legal principles applied in disputes between real-world 
neighbors (such as trespass, nuisance, or even adverse possession) could, at 
the very least, add familiar context to a virtual dispute.  Assuming courts 
first find a protectable virtual property interest, real-world precedent could 
be applied by analogy to help resolve disputes between users.  The analogy 
most appropriate to a given case could help determine, in turn, whether the 
court should give deference to any party through, e.g., assignment of bur-
dens of proof. 
Thus, virtual property disputes between multiple users differ from dis-
putes between a user and a service provider, because the latter dispute im-
plicates inherent equitable and policy concerns that favor the service pro-
vider.  The licensor-licensee analogy aptly frames the user-to-service pro-
vider relationship.  The user-to-user relationship, however, may vary in 
every case.  Therefore, resolving a dispute between users may require a 
more detailed analysis of individual property interests, including the inter-
ests of the service provider—likely an affected party. 
B.  The Parties’ Interests 
1.  Service Providers’ Interests 
Internet service providers react with understandable negativity toward 
the recognition of legally enforceable virtual property interests.74  Con-
  
 74. See, e.g., Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 1 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 19, 37 (2004-2005) (arguing, inter alia, that recognizing users’ virtual property interests 
would undermine service providers’ ability to control the quality of the service).  Note that “Dr. Bartle 
is one of the fathers of modern virtual worlds, having designed the early text-based virtual environ-
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versely, users tend to embrace the concept.75  Superficially, granting a new 
property interest to users appears to carve a chunk of rights out of the ser-
vice providers’ intellectual property.  Because the development of mas-
sively multi-user Internet-based services often involves a large, risky initial 
investment in equipment, capital, software, and intellectual property, to be 
recouped gradually over time, service providers are understandably unwill-
ing to abandon any assets of value, intangible or otherwise.76  Conse-
quently, service providers may see an interest in capturing the value of 
virtual property by preserving the legal status quo, although lawsuits loom 
imminently and obviously on the horizon, poised ready to test (and proba-
bly unsettle) this area of law.77  In addition, some service providers fear 
that recognizing virtual property will expose them to additional liability, 
thereby restricting their ability to control the quality of their service and 
generally dampening the incentive for Internet businesses to innovate and 
improve.78  Given the notoriously fickle nature and rapidly shifting loyal-
ties of Internet consumers,79 quality control and continuing improvement 
are integral components of the business model for the vast majority of 
online content providers.80  Finally, service providers need legal stability 
and certainty to design effective services and to craft enforceable contracts.  
  
ments.”  Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1097 n.253.  See also, e.g., What Exactly is the EUALA? What 
Does it Say? Dark Age of Camelot (TM) End User Access and License Agreement, 
http://support.darkageofcamelot.com/ kb/article.php?id=072, § 2(A) (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) [here-
inafter Dark Age of Camelot EUALA] (explicitly contracting with users to disclaim or assign virtual 
property interests in their accounts in exchange for access to the service).  
 75. See generally  Fairfield, supra note 6 (advocating for the legal recognition of virtual property 
interests). 
 76. See MacInnes, supra note 62, at 21-29 (outlining the concerns of a virtual-world service pro-
vider during the developmental stages of the business). 
 77. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 72 (suggesting that virtual property lawsuits, similar 
to the Blacksnow case, are imminent and inevitable). 
 78. Bartle, supra note 74, at 37; MacInnes, supra note 62, at 2731-32 (describing the “control para-
dox” faced by MMOG developers); see Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1097-99 (raising and refuting these 
objections to virtual property commonly raised by service providers). 
 79. A single mistake by a service provider may destroy all public goodwill and ruin an Internet 
business.  As a famous example, shortly after the highly publicized 2003 release of the MMOG Shad-
owbane, by Ubi Soft and Wolfpack Studios, the game was briefly (but very publicly) hacked.  Al-
though no permanent damage resulted, many players lost confidence in the game’s security and pro-
gramming integrity.  See, e.g., Shadowbane Hacked, Game Over, http://www.gamerifts.com/cgi-
bin/newspro/ fullnews.cgi?newsid1054080000,36908 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (“I was one of the 
most vocal defenders of all Shadowbane stood for . . . .  But at some point, enough is enough.  I’ve had 
enough. . . . if you still have an account, you are an idiot.”).  Relative to the competition, Shadowbane 
became a phenomenal flop and failed to generate a profit.  See BRUCE WOODCOCK, AN ANALYSIS OF 
MMOG SUBSCRIPTION GROWTH, http://www.mmogchart.com/Analysis.html (last visited Oct. 31, 
2006) (citing MMOG subscription statistics indicating that Shadowbane failed to generate a profit). 
 80. All MMOG providers constantly improve their services by creating “patches” to add new con-
tent and to fix design flaws.  Users not only accept this frequent “patching,” they expect it as part of the 
service. 
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Thus, maintaining the legal status quo would serve multiple interests of 
service providers. 
Service providers also have an interest in disputes between users being 
resolved in an agreeable and orderly manner with minimal intervention 
from the service providers themselves.  To begin with, service providers 
have no legal obligation to mediate disputes between users arising out of 
the service.  Many online content providers have deliberately chosen not to 
involve themselves in such disputes, even if the dispute concerns a ques-
tion of account access.81  Although such a practice eliminates a potential 
avenue of redress for a user who has been defrauded by a scammer,82 
thereby potentially producing unhappy customers and inviting fraudulent 
behavior, the prospect of becoming mired in the unpredictable, uncontrol-
lable details of user interactions, both inside and outside the virtual envi-
ronment, seems even more onerous.  For example, as an international vir-
tual market for substantial volumes of property, eBay.com spends signifi-
cant resources and struggles continuously to find a profitable balance be-
tween a laissez-faire “hands-off” approach and strict regulation.83   
Moreover, open involvement in dispute resolution by the service pro-
vider invites scammers to manipulate the providers’ policies and rules to 
use the provider as an accessory to fraud.  To some service providers, “if 
you build a better mousetrap, the mouse will just get smarter.”  Such poli-
cies reflect a business decision to avoid involvement in litigation between 
users.  Acknowledging that disputes between users are inevitable, it is in 
the service providers’ interest for such disputes to be resolved in an agree-
able, fair, and efficient manner, whether by operation of law, contract, or 
business practice, or by the intervention of some third party.  Therefore, 
service providers would benefit from the legal recognition of virtual prop-
erty, assuming such recognition gave users an avenue of redress from the 
actions of other users. 
Thus, in the perpetual effort to profit and grow, service providers gen-
erally seek the freedom to make the business decisions necessary to maxi-
mize user loyalty through a combination of innovation and quality control.  
  
 81. See, e.g., Dark Age of Camelot EUALA, supra note 74, § 1(D) (“You are responsible for . . . any 
damage, harm, lost or deleted characters, etc. resulting from . . . use by any person of your Passwords 
to gain access to your Account.  IN NO EVENT SHALL MYTHIC ENTERTAINMENT BE HELD 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE THAT OCCURS TO YOUR ACCOUNT, YOUR 
CHARACTERS OR THEIR POSSESSIONS IN THE EVENT YOUR PASSWORDS ARE 
DISCLOSED . . . .”). 
 82. Unquestionably, in some situations, the service provider may be the only party in a position to 
remedy a fraud. 
 83. See generally, e.g., eBay Security Center: Rules & Policies, http://pages.ebay.com/ 
securitycenter/ rules_policies.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (providing access to numerous webpages 
detailing eBay’s fraud prevention and dispute resolution policies). 
156 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 1 
Although some providers’ policies (such as a “hands-off” dispute resolu-
tion policy) may seem to inhibit users’ virtual property interests, no service 
provider (which intends to succeed) is genuinely interested in sabotaging 
the legal rights of its customers.  Therefore, while none of the service pro-
viders’ interests should entirely negate the legal enforceability of users’ 
virtual property interests, these interests and practical business concerns 
are certainly legitimate, and they should be acknowledged whenever any 
court adjudicates a virtual property dispute. 
2.  Users’ Interests 
At first blush, the interests of those who routinely use virtual property 
would seem to be in direct tension with the interests of service providers.  
Users, however, have several legitimate interests that do not conflict with 
the interests of service providers.  Moreover, the apparent conflict between 
users’ and service providers’ interests arises from the misconception that 
recognizing virtual property would somehow divide and redistribute ser-
vice providers’ valuable traditional property. 
The misconception arises when users view overturning the legal status 
quo as akin to the government endorsing a currently underground form of 
currency, thereby ascribing monetary value to nothingness solely to the 
users’ benefit.  For example, if tomorrow the government began accepting 
virtual platinum coins from Everquest (a popular MMOG) as an alternative 
means of collecting income taxes, certainly very few players would object, 
as this would be a substantial windfall.84  Thus, given the intangible nature 
of virtual property, proponents may become hopelessly tangled in the ro-
mantic prospect of creating something from nothing.  Under this illusion, 
the Internet becomes a new Wild West, with a seemingly unlimited ex-
panse of frontier property ripe for the taking.85  This reasoning then be-
comes the target of criticism.86  The legal reality, however, is not so sim-
ple. 
Users have legitimate interests beyond the simple desire to amass 
property in all its forms.  The most apparent and commonly cited interest 
  
 84. Disregarding, for the moment, the obvious negative long-term side-effects this would have on 
the national and Everquest economies. 
 85. See, e.g., Shamoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Nonregulation as the Answer to the 
Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 435, 436 (2000) (“Today’s Wild West is the Internet.”). 
 86. See Hunter, supra note 29, at 513 (challenging the “cyberspace as place” metaphor as leading to 
a tragedy of the anticommons, wherein competing exclusionary rights lead to suboptimal overall utili-
zation); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyber-
space, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1232, 1240, 1247-48 (2002) (rejecting the Western Frontier 
analogy as misleading and overly optimistic and suggesting, instead, that the Internet is more like a 
feudal society of “cyberlords” and “cyberserfs”). 
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for players of MMOGs is in the value of time.87  The addictive nature of 
MMOGs causes players to spend tremendous amounts of time developing 
their avatars online.88  For the average player seeking to accomplish the 
game’s objectives, each hour spent online usually translates into an incre-
mental increase in the avatar’s secondary market value.89  For example, in 
2001, economist Edward Castronova calculated the average “hourly wage” 
earned by Everquest players as $3.42 per hour spent online.90  Notably, for 
a minority of Everquest players (those who spend over eighty hours per 
week online), this “wage” would place them above the poverty line.91  
However, time commitment alone does not create value per se. 
Illustratively, when a buyer on a secondary market purchases a 
MMOG account, he generally does not care how much time was spent 
developing the account; rather, the buyer cares about the amount of virtual 
treasure accumulated by the seller and stored on the account.  Literally, the 
buyer pays for a Level 50 Warrior with a full set of Oceanic armor, and it 
is disingenuous to suggest that the buyer is “employing” the seller, retro-
spectively, at a rate of $3.42 per hour, to spend the 100 hours necessary to 
develop a Warrior to Level 50 and to acquire a full set of Oceanic armor.92  
The “employment” analogy, however, is gaining popularity as a technical 
argument developed to circumvent clauses in some MMOG End User Li-
cense Agreements that restrict the resale of virtual property.93  For exam-
ple, some listings on eBay.com contain language similar to:  
  
 87. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 39-40 (presenting the arguments raised by counsel to 
Blacksnow Interactive, in Blacksnow Interactive v. Mythic Entertainment (case later dropped), which, 
inter alia, asserted that players have an equitable interest in the value of their time spent online); see 
also Castronova, supra note 3, at 14 (“developing the avatar’s skills takes time . . . all this effort . . . can 
take hundreds of hours.”). 
 88. See Dibbell, supra note 30 (describing how carpenter Troy Stolle would come home from work 
every day immediately to resume his second “job” as a virtual blacksmith in Ultima Online); see gen-
erally YEE, supra note 54 (discussing the design elements of MMOGs which cultivate addictive behav-
ior in players). 
 89. See supra Part II.A.5 (discussing value-added-by-user as an indicia of virtual property and citing 
MMOG accounts as the quintessential example); see also Castronova, supra note 3 (calculating the 
average resultant increase in the secondary market value of an Everquest player’s account per hour 
spent online). 
 90. Castronova, supra note 3, at 35.  This “wage,” however, was not paid as U.S. dollars but was 
reflected by the account’s increased secondary market value. 
 91. Id. at 36. 
 92. Evidence suggests that the average player spends much more than 100 hours developing a 
MMOG character.  See generally YEE, supra note 54 (charting and analyzing addictive behaviors 
demonstrated by many who play MMOGs). 
 93. For some companies, the analogy is reality.  Players may prospectively hire hourly services, 
such as those offered by Topgameseller.com, to develop their characters—in contrast to the retrospec-
tive “services” offered by players who sell their accounts.  See Topgameseller.com Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.topgameseller.com/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (describing the business 
and services offered by Topgameseller.com—for example:  “We assign 2 or 3 expert players to your 
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Disclaimer: You are bidding on my time leveling for this account. Said 
account remains the property of Blizzard [Entertainment]. You will not 
‘OWN’ the account, for it belongs to Blizzard. The only thing you are bid-
ding on is the time I have invested into the account. All characters, items, 
in-game currency, and anything else associated with this auction will re-
main the property of Blizzard.94  
Such language raises three unresolved issues: (1) whether the eBay 
buyer would be able to enforce the contract against the seller;95 (2) whether 
such language successfully evades EULA restrictions;96 and most impor-
tantly (3) whether the relevant typical MMOG EULA restrictions them-
selves are legally enforceable.97  At first blush, the MMOG secondary 
market appears to value only the virtual property itself and not the player’s 
underlying time commitment.  However, the secondary market value of the 
virtual treasure, in turn, correlates strongly with the amount of time neces-
sary to acquire the treasure.  All parties concerned may be well aware of 
the 100 hours of playtime typically required to develop the illustrative 
Level 50 Warrior with Oceanic armor.  Thus, the buyer is spending 
$342.00 to save himself 100 hours of tedious character development.  The 
enforceability of a contract selling access to the Warrior should not hinge 
on a tedious distinction between prospective and retrospective labor.  If 
anything, the unresolved issues surrounding secondary market exchanges 
of virtual property demonstrate one of the users’ strongest interests: the 
interest in legal certainty.  This is not the only interest shared by both users 
and service providers. 
  
character to do the leveling . . . .  We have extensive knowledge of your game’s world and know the 
best areas & quests to level your character as fast as possible.”). 
 94. This disclaimer was compiled from a variety of eBay listings containing similar language. 
 95. Depending on the level of legal abstraction, whether “time leveling for this account” constitutes 
consideration becomes an interesting question.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 71, 86 (1981) (generally reciting the requirement of consideration in contract law and addressing 
issues raised by promises made in recognition of past performance).  Once again, prudence should 
dictate a practical approach—looking to the actual effect of the contract rather than its deliberately 
slippery language.  “[F]orm should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on eco-
nomic reality.”  Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (referring to securities).  In economic 
reality, virtual property is changing hands. 
 96. See Dark Age of Camelot EUALA, supra note 74, § 2(A) (“YOU SPECIFICALLY 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE TIME YOU SPEND PLAYING DARK AGE OF CAMELOT(TM) IS 
FOR ENTERTAINMENT PURPOSES ONLY, AND THAT YOU CLAIM NO INTEREST IN THE 
VALUE OF SUCH TIME.”). 
 97. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981) (reciting principle that a 
promise may be unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of 
trade, i.e., limiting competition in any business); Grierson, supra note 2 (collecting discussion and case 
law relating to software licenses but not specifically pertaining to virtual property). 
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3. Shared Interests 
In many respects, users and service providers share similar interests 
that may be reconciled with minimal tension.  Users benefit when service 
providers experiment, innovate, and improve their services.  Thus, users 
directly share the service providers’ interest in the orderly resolution of 
disputes without requiring service providers’ involvement.  Users also 
share the service providers’ interest in protecting the large, requisite in-
vestment in hardware, software, and intellectual property, because, as men-
tioned above, this promotes development.98  The social and macroeco-
nomic value of a dynamic and rapidly growing Internet cannot be overes-
timated.  As the automobile revolutionized the twentieth century, the Inter-
net (and virtual environments in particular) will drive world industry in 
new directions for generations to come.  Therefore, as a policy matter, all 
people share the service providers’ interest in maintaining the freedom to 
innovate and to control the quality of online services. 
On a more immediate and practical level, service providers share us-
ers’ interest in preserving the value of virtual property through transactions 
in secondary markets, subject to some qualifications.  Logically, the most 
highly developed user accounts are also the most valuable.99  Likewise, 
users with highly developed accounts are more likely to contribute actively 
to the service provider’s popularity and profitability—whether through a 
sense of irreversible commitment (i.e., addiction) or earnest goodwill.  
Thus, when one user decides to conclude his relationship with a service 
provider, the remaining users and the service provider share a business 
interest in preserving the value of the departing user’s account. 
Lastly, both service providers and users share a generalized interest in 
the reduction or prevention of disputes and in resolving such disputes fairly 
and efficiently.  Here, again, as in many other areas of law, simply decid-
ing the issue one way or another would promote development by eliminat-
ing uncertainty.100  At the very least, lawmaking action (if carefully under-
  
 98. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing service providers’ interest in retaining enforceable rights as a 
means of recouping initial investment). 
 99. See Dibbell, supra note 30 (discussing the disposition of Troy Stolle’s account, in the MMOG 
Ultima Online, which, after fifty-two weeks of development, was worth $1500 to $2000). 
 100. Although the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), promulgated in 2000 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but only adopted (as of March, 
2006) in Maryland and Virginia, addresses the enforceability of click-wrap licenses and other Internet 
transactions, none of its sections deal explicitly with virtual property, and none of UCITA’s comments 
or legislative history address the subject.  See, e.g., UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 
112, 114, 210 (amended 2002) (sections affecting the enforceability of click-wrap licenses); see Grier-
son, supra note 2, at § 2[b] (briefly discussing the effect of UCITA on the enforceability of click-wrap 
licenses).  Note, also, that some states have enacted so-called “bomb shelter” laws that render choice of 
law clauses in contracts unenforceable against residents of those states to the extent that the contract 
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taken) could allow online service providers to draft simpler End User Li-
cense Agreements, which, in turn, would be more likely to be understood 
by the average licensee of virtual property.  This would benefit both ser-
vice providers and users by establishing, finally, the limits of the users’ 
enforceable property rights. 
C.  Striking a Balance 
Users and service providers should squarely confront the merits of vir-
tual property issues as such.  Tiptoeing around the concept of virtual prop-
erty by resorting to semantic technicalities only adds uncertainty, thereby 
hampering the development of secondary markets and other economically 
valuable satellite industries.101  All parties involved need to know exactly 
which contracts involving virtual property are enforceable and which ones 
are not. 
Therefore, courts and legislatures should openly discuss the implica-
tions of virtual property and recognize the distinction between the two 
types of disputes that could potentially arise.  Between a user and a service 
provider, the overall balance must tip in favor of the service provider, in 
the interest of promoting innovation and quality control (and in recognition 
of the practical realities of the marketplace).  Between the user and another 
user, however, public policy demands stronger, more clearly defined, and 
enforceable virtual property interests.  Moreover, the provisions of a li-
cense agreement governing the relationship between a user and a service 
provider should not unduly intrude into a legal dispute between two us-
ers.102  Likewise, in adjudicating disputes between users, courts must tread 
carefully to avoid creating law that would unduly hinder the freedom and 
legitimate interests of service providers—for example, by affecting the 
service providers’ ability to control their real world chattels. 
  
calls for application of the law of a state that has enacted UCITA.  E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 
(2005) (North Carolina “bomb-shelter”); Grierson, supra note 2, § 2[b].  Moreover, UCITA has not 
received a warm welcome.  E.g., Jason Krause, SEE YA, UCITA: Uniform Law on Software Sales 
Never Got Traction with ABA, 89 A.B.A. J. 20 (2003) (“[UCITA’s] recent failure to earn ABA ap-
proval effectively destroyed its future.”).  Thus, the only potentially relevant lawmaking action (in this 
case by state legislatures) has failed to gain momentum due to perceived inherent flaws.  Whether the 
next step should come from a legislature or a court remains to be determined. 
 101. See supra Part III.B.2 (reciting problematic language typically employed by users who sell 
virtual property on eBay.com in an effort to disguise a sale of virtual property). 
 102. In an effort to protect themselves from litigation raising the virtual property premise, service 
providers often include clauses in EULAs forcing users to disclaim all property interests in their ac-
counts.  Such an EULA could be used to moot a dispute between two users, e.g., by voiding a secon-
dary market transaction, thereby undermining any discussion of the merits of the case.  This would be 
one example of the provisions of a license agreement governing the relationship between a user and a 
service provider unduly intruding into a legal dispute between two users. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
When faced with a potential virtual property dispute, courts should ap-
ply a three-step analysis: (1) using the five indicia of virtual property (ri-
valry, persistence, interconnectivity, secondary markets, and value-added-
by-users), identify and delineate the virtual property at issue; (2) identify 
the interests of the parties affected, either through analogy to a pre-existing 
legal relationship (such as the licensor-licensee relationship) or through 
specific fact-finding relevant to the industry at hand; and (3) balance those 
interests to reach an equitable solution, with particular attention to preserv-
ing the freedom and flexibility of service providers. 
The development of multi-million-dollar secondary markets based en-
tirely on the exchange of virtual property reflects the fringes of a nascent 
international industry, which, if properly cultivated, could yield enormous 
future economic and social value.  The time has come to recognize virtual 
property in the courtroom, at least in disputes between users, in order to 
encourage secondary market trades and innovative business models.  Fur-
thermore, as the door swings open to reveal this new frontier, we must 
always remember the legitimate property interests of the creators and inno-
vators—the service providers—without whom this frontier would not exist. 
 
